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The science of adolescent brain development is making itsway into the national conversation. As an early researcherin the field, I regularly receive calls from journalists ask-
ing how the science of adolescent brain development should
affect the way society treats teenagers. I have been asked
whether this science justifies raising the driving age, outlawing
the solitary confinement of incarcerated juveniles, excluding
18-year-olds from the military, or prohibiting 16-year-olds
from serving as lifeguards on the Jersey Shore. Explicit refer-
ence to the neuroscience of adolescence is slowly creeping into
legal and policy discussions as well as popular culture. The
U.S. Supreme Court discussed adolescent brain science during
oral arguments in Roper v. Simmons,1 which abolished the
juvenile death penalty, and cited the field in its 2010 decision
in Graham v. Florida,2 which prohibited the sentencing of
juveniles convicted of crimes other than homicide to life with-
out parole.
There is now incontrovertible evidence that adolescence is
a period of significant changes in brain structure and function.
Although most of this work has appeared just in the past 15
years, there is already strong consensus among developmental
neuroscientists about the nature of these changes. And the
most important conclusion to emerge from recent research is
that important changes in brain anatomy and activity take
place far longer into development than had been previously
thought. Reasonable people may disagree about what these
findings may mean as society decides how to treat young peo-
ple, but there is little room for disagreement about the fact that
adolescence is a period of substantial brain maturation with
respect to both structure and function.
BRAIN CHANGES
There are four noteworthy, structural changes in the brain
during adolescence. First, there is a decrease in gray matter in
prefrontal regions of the brain, reflective of synaptic pruning,
the process through which unused connections between neu-
rons are eliminated. The elimination of these unused synapses
occurs mainly during pre-adolescence and early adolescence,
when major improvements in basic cognitive abilities and log-
ical reasoning are seen, in part due to these very anatomical
changes.
Second, important changes in activity involving the neuro-
transmitter dopamine occur during early adolescence, espe-
cially around puberty. There are substantial changes in the
density and distribution of dopamine receptors in pathways
that connect the limbic system and prefrontal cortex. The lim-
bic system is associated with emotions, rewards, and punish-
ments, and the prefrontal cortex is the brain’s chief executive
officer. There is more dopaminergic activity in the pathways
that connect the two during the first part of adolescence than
at any other time in development. Because dopamine plays a
critical role in how humans experience pleasure, these changes
have important implications for sensation-seeking.
Third, there is an increase in the strength of connections
between the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system. If you
were to compare a young teenager’s brain with that of a young
adult, you would see a much more extensive network of myeli-
nated cables connecting brain regions. This anatomical change
is especially important for emotion regulation, which is facili-
tated by increased connectivity between regions important in
the processing of emotional information and those important
in self-control. These connections permit different brain sys-
tems to communicate with each other more effectively, and
these gains are also ongoing well into late adolescence.
Fourth, there is an increase in white matter in the prefrontal
cortex during adolescence. This is largely the result of myeli-
nation, the process through which nerve fibers become
sheathed in myelin, a white, fatty substance that improves the
efficiency of brain circuits. Unlike the synaptic pruning of the
prefrontal areas, which is mainly finished by mid-adolescence,
myelination continues well into late adolescence and early
adulthood. This increased efficiency in neural connections
within the prefrontal cortex is important for higher-order cog-
nitive functions—planning ahead, weighing risks and rewards,
and making complicated decisions, among others—that are
regulated by multiple prefrontal areas working in concert.
Adolescence is not just a time of tremendous change in the
brain’s structure. It is also a time of important changes in how
the brain works, as revealed in studies using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging, or fMRI. What do these imaging
studies reveal about the adolescent brain? First, over the
course of adolescence and into early adulthood, there is a
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strengthening of activity in brain systems involving self-regu-
lation. During tasks that require self-control, adults employ a
wider network of brain regions than do adolescents, and this
trait may make self-control easier, by distributing the work
across multiple areas of the brain rather than overtaxing a
smaller number of regions.
Second, there are important changes in the way the brain
responds to rewards. When one examines brain scans of indi-
viduals who are shown rewarding stimuli, such as piles of
coins or pictures of happy faces, adolescents’ reward centers
are usually activated more than children’s or adults’ brains.
(Interestingly, these age differences are more consistently
observed when individuals are anticipating rewards than
when they are receiving them.) Heightened sensitivity to
anticipated rewards motivates adolescents to engage in risky
acts when the potential for pleasure is high, such as with
unprotected sex, fast driving, or experimentation with drugs.
In our laboratory, Jason Chein and I have shown that this
hypersensitivity to reward is particularly pronounced when
adolescents are with their friends, and we think this helps
explain why adolescent risk-taking so often occurs in
groups.3
A third change in brain function over the course of adoles-
cence involves increases in the simultaneous involvement of
multiple brain regions in response to arousing stimuli, such as
pictures of angry or terrified faces. Before adulthood, there is
less cross-talk between the brain systems that regulate rational
decision-making and those that regulate emotional arousal.
During adolescence, very strong feelings are less likely to be
modulated by the involvement of brain regions involved in
controlling impulses, planning ahead, and comparing the costs
and benefits of alternative courses of action. This is one reason
why susceptibility to peer pressure declines as adolescents
grow into adulthood; as they mature, individuals become bet-
ter able to put the brakes on an impulse that is aroused by their
friends.
IMPORTANCE OF TIMING
These structural and functional changes do not all take
place along one uniform timetable, and the differences in their
timing raise two important points relevant to the use of neuro-
science in public policy. First, there is no simple answer to the
question of when an adolescent brain becomes an adult brain.
Brain systems implicated in basic cognitive processes reach
adult levels of maturity by mid-adolescence, whereas those
that are active in self-regulation do not fully mature until late
adolescence or even early adulthood. In other words, adoles-
cents mature intellectually before they mature socially or emo-
tionally, a fact that helps explain why teenagers who are so
smart in some respects sometimes do surprisingly dumb
things.
To the extent that society wishes to use developmental neu-
roscience to inform public policy decisions on where to draw
age boundaries between adolescence and adulthood, it is
important to match the policy
question with the right science.
In his dissenting opinion in
Roper, the juvenile-death-penalty
case, Justice Antonin Scalia criti-
cized the American Psychological
Association, which submitted an
amicus brief arguing that adoles-
cents are not as mature as adults
and therefore should not be eligi-
ble for the death penalty. As Scalia
pointed out, the association had previously taken the stance
that adolescents should be permitted to make decisions about
abortion without involving their parents, because young peo-
ple’s decision-making is just as competent as that of adults.
The association’s two positions may seem inconsistent at
first glance, but it is entirely possible that an adolescent might
be mature enough for some decisions but not others. After all,
the circumstances under which individuals make medical deci-
sions and commit crimes are very different and make different
sorts of demands on their brains and abilities. State laws gov-
erning adolescent abortion require a waiting period before the
procedure can be performed, as well as consultation with an
adult—a parent, health care provider, or judge. These policies
discourage impetuous and shortsighted acts and create cir-
cumstances under which adolescents have been shown to be
just as competent at making decisions as adults. In contrast,
violent crimes are usually committed by adolescents when they
are emotionally aroused and with their friends—two condi-
tions that increase the likelihood of impulsivity and sensation-
seeking and that exacerbate adolescent immaturity. From a
neuroscientific standpoint, it therefore makes perfect sense to
have a lower age for autonomous medical decision-making
than for eligibility for capital punishment, because certain
brain systems mature earlier than others.
There is another kind of asynchrony in brain development
during adolescence that is important for public policy. Middle
adolescence is a period during which brain systems implicated
in how a person responds to rewards are at their height of
arousability but systems important for self-regulation are still
immature. The different timetables followed by these different
brain systems create a vulnerability to risky and reckless
behavior that is greater in middle adolescence than before or
after. It’s as if the brain’s accelerator is pressed to the floor
before a good braking system is in place. Given this, it is no
surprise that criminal activity peaks around age 17—as does
first experimentation with alcohol and marijuana, automobile
crashes, accidental drownings, and attempted suicide.
In sum, the consensus emerging from recent research on the
adolescent brain is that teenagers are not as mature as adults in
either brain structure or function. This does not mean that
adolescents’ brains are “defective,” just as newborns’ muscular
systems, which do not allow them to walk, or language sys-
tems, which do not allow them to carry on conversations, are
3. Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhanc-
ing Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14(2) DEVELOPMENTAL
SCI. F1(2011). 
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not defective. The fact that the
adolescent brain is still develop-
ing, and in this regard is less
mature than the adult brain, is
normative, not pathological. Ado-
lescence is a developmental stage,
not a disease, mental illness, or
defect. But it is a time when peo-
ple are, on average, not as mature
as they will be in adulthood.
I am frequently asked how to
reconcile this view of adolescence with historical evidence that
adolescents successfully performed adult roles in previous
eras. This may be true, but all societies in recorded history
have recognized a period of development between childhood
and adulthood, and writers as far back as Aristotle have char-
acterized adolescents as less able to control themselves and
more prone to risk-taking than adults. In 1623 (without the
benefit of brain scans), Shakespeare wrote in The Winter’s Tale:
“I would there were no age between ten and three-and-twenty,
or that youth would sleep out the rest; for there is nothing in
the between but getting wenches with child, wronging the
ancientry, stealing, fighting.”
SCIENCE IN THE POLICY ARENA
Although there is a good degree of consensus among neu-
roscientists about many of the ways in which brain structure
and function change during adolescence, it is less clear just
how informative this work is about adolescent behavior for
public policy. Because all behavior must have neurobiological
underpinnings, it is hardly revelatory to say that adolescents
behave the way they do because of “something in their brain.”
Moreover, society hardly needs neuroscience to tell it that, rel-
ative to adults, adolescents are more likely to engage in sensa-
tion seeking, less likely to control their impulses, or less likely
to plan ahead. So how does neuroscience add to society’s
understanding of adolescent behavior? What is the value,
other than advances in basic neuroscience, of studies that pro-
vide neurobiological evidence that is consistent with what is
already known about human behavior?
I will consider five such possibilities, two that I think are
valid, two that I think are mistaken, and one where my assess-
ment is equivocal. Let me begin with two rationales that are
widely believed but that are specious.
The first mistake is to interpret age differences in brain
structure or function as conclusive evidence that certain
behaviors must be hard-wired. A correlation between brain
development and behavioral development is just that: a corre-
lation. It says nothing about the causes of the behavior or
about the relative contributions of nature and nurture. In some
cases, the behavior may indeed follow directly from biologi-
cally driven changes in brain structure or function. But in oth-
ers, the reverse is true—that is, the observed brain change is
the consequence of experience. Yes, adolescents may develop
better impulse control as a result of changes within the pre-
frontal cortex, and it may be true that these anatomical
changes are programmed to unfold along a predetermined
timetable. But it is also plausible that the structural changes
observed in the prefrontal cortex result from experiences that
demand that adolescents exercise self-control, in much the
same way that changes in muscle structure and function often
follow from exercise.
A second mistake is assuming that the existence of a bio-
logical correlate of some behavior demonstrates that the
behavior cannot be changed. It is surely the case that some of
the changes in brain structure and function that take place
during adolescence are relatively impervious to environmental
influence. But the brain is malleable, and there is a good deal
of evidence that adolescence is, in fact, a period of especially
heightened neuroplasticity. That’s one reason it is a period of
such vulnerability to many forms of mental illness.
I suspect that the changes in reward sensitivity that I
described earlier are largely determined by biology and, in par-
ticular, by puberty. I say this because the changes in reward
seeking observed in young adolescents are also seen in other
mammals when they go through puberty. This makes perfect
sense from an evolutionary perspective because adolescence is
the period during which mammals become sexually active, a
behavior that is motivated by the expectation of pleasure. An
increase in reward sensitivity soon after puberty is added
insurance that mammals will do what it takes to reproduce
while they are at the peak of fertility, including engaging in a
certain amount of risky behavior, such as leaving the nest or
troop to venture out into the wild. In fact, the age at peak
human fecundity (that is, the age at which an individual
should begin having sex if he or she wants to have the most
children possible) is about the same as the age at the peak of
risk-taking—between 16 and 17 years of age.
Other brain changes that take place during adolescence are
probably driven to a great extent by nurture and may therefore
be modifiable by experience. There is growing evidence that
the actual structure of prefrontal regions active in self-control
can be influenced by training and practice. So in addition to
assuming that biology causes behavior, and not the reverse, it
is also a mistake to think that the biology of the brain cannot
be changed.
HOW SCIENCE CAN HELP
How, then, does neuroscience contribute to a better under-
standing of adolescent behavior? As I said, I think the neuro-
science serves at least two important functions.
First, neuroscientific evidence can provide added support
for behavioral evidence when the neuroscience and the behav-
ioral science are conceptually and theoretically aligned. Notice
that I used the word “support” here. When neuroscientific
findings about adolescent brain development are consistent
with findings from behavioral research, the neuroscience pro-
vides added confidence in the behavioral findings; scientific
evidence of any sort is always more compelling when it has
been shown to be valid. But it is incorrect to privilege the neu-
roscientific evidence over the behavioral evidence, which is
frequently done because the neuroscientific evidence is often
incorrectly assumed to be more reliable, precise, or valid. Many
nonscientists are more persuaded by neuroscience than by
behavioral science, because they often lack the training or
expertise that would enable them to view the neuroscience
through a critical lens. In science, familiarity breeds skepti-
cism, and the lack of knowledge that most laypersons have
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about the workings of the brain, much less the nuances of neu-
roscientific methods, often leads them to be overly impressed
by brain science and underwhelmed by behavioral research,
even when the latter may be more relevant to policy decisions.
A second way in which neuroscience can be useful is that it
may help generate new hypotheses about adolescent develop-
ment that can then be tested in behavioral studies. This is espe-
cially important when behavioral methods cannot be used to
test alternative accounts of a phenomenon. Let me illustrate
this point with an example from our ongoing research.
As I noted earlier, it has been hypothesized that heightened
risk-taking in adolescence is thought to be the product of an
easily aroused reward system and an immature self-regulatory
system. The arousal of the reward system takes place early in
adolescence and is closely tied to puberty, whereas the matura-
tion of the self-regulatory system is independent of puberty
and unfolds gradually, from preadolescence through young
adulthood.
In our studies, we have shown that reward sensitivity, pref-
erence for immediate rewards, sensation-seeking, and a greater
focus on the rewards of a risky choice all increase between pre-
adolescence and mid-adolescence, peak between ages 15 and
17, and then decline.4 In contrast, controlling impulses, plan-
ning ahead, and resisting peer influence all increase gradually
from pre-adolescence through late adolescence, and in some
instances, into early adulthood.
Although one can show without the benefit of neuro-
science that the inclination to take risks is generally higher in
adolescence than before or after, having knowledge about the
course of brain development provides insight into the under-
lying processes that might account for this pattern. We’ve
shown in several experiments that adolescents take more risks
when they are with their friends than when they are alone. But
is this because the presence of peers interferes with self-con-
trol or because it affects the way in which adolescents experi-
ence the rewards of the risky decision? It isn’t possible to
answer this question by asking teenagers why they take more
risks when their friends are around.  They admit that they do,
but they say they do not know why. But through neuroimag-
ing, we discovered that the peer effect was specifically due to
the impact that peers have on adolescents’ reward sensitivity.
Why does this matter? Because if the chief reason that adoles-
cents experiment with tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs is
that they are at a point in life where everything rewarding feels
especially so, trying to teach them to “Just Say No” is proba-
bly futile. I have argued elsewhere that raising the price of cig-
arettes and alcohol, thereby making these rewarding sub-
stances harder to obtain, is probably a more effective public
policy than health education.5
I have now described two valid reasons to use neuroscience
to better understand adolescent behavior and two questionable
ones. I want to add a fifth, which
concerns the attributions we
make about individuals’ behavior.
This particular use of neuro-
science is having a tremendous
impact on criminal law.
A few years ago I was asked to
provide an expert opinion in a
Michigan case involving a prison
inmate named Anthony, who as a
17-year-old was part of a group of
teenagers who robbed a small
store. During the robbery, one of
the teenagers shot and killed the
storekeeper. Although the
teenagers had planned the robbery, they did not engage in the
act with the intention of shooting, much less murdering, some-
one. But under the state’s criminal law, the crime qualified as
felony murder, which in Michigan carries a mandatory sen-
tence of life without the possibility of parole for all members of
the group involved in the robbery—including Anthony, who
had fled the store before the shooting took place.
Anthony—who has been in prison for 33 years—requested
that his sentence be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in Graham v. Florida that life without parole is cruel and
unusual punishment for juveniles because they are less mature
than adults.6 The ruling in that case was limited to crimes
other than homicide, so Anthony’s challenge was based on the
argument that the logic behind the Graham decision applies
to felony murder as well.
I was asked specifically whether a 17-year-old could have
anticipated that someone might be killed during the robbery.
It is quite clear from the trial transcript that Anthony didn’t
anticipate this consequence, but “didn’t” is not the same as
“couldn’t.” It is known from behavioral research that the aver-
age 17-year-old is less likely than the average adult to think
ahead, control his impulses, and foresee the consequences of
his actions, and clinical evaluations of Anthony revealed that
he was a normal 17-year-old. But “less likely” means just that;
it doesn’t mean “unable,” but neither does it mean “unwill-
ing.” As I will explain, the distinction between “didn’t” and
“couldn’t” is important under the law. And studies of adoles-
cent brain development might be helpful in distinguishing
between the two.
The issue was not whether Anthony is guilty. He freely
admitted having participated in the robbery, and there was
clear evidence that the victim was shot and killed by one of the
robbers. But even when someone is guilty, many factors can
influence the sentence he receives. Individuals who are
deemed less than fully responsible are punished less severely
than those who are judged to be fully responsible, even if the
“We’ve shown
in several
experiments
that adolescents
take more risks
when they are
with their
friends than
when they are
alone.”
Court Review - Volume 50 73
7. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Devel-
opment Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739 (2009).
8. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUS-
TICE (2008); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)matu-
rity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Cul-
pable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741 (2000); Laurence Stein-
berg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLIN-
ICAL PSYCHOL. 47 (2009).
consequences of the act are iden-
tical. For example, manslaughter
is not punished as harshly as
premeditated murder, even
though both result in the death
of another individual. So the
question in Anthony’s case, as it
was in the Roper and Graham
Supreme Court cases, was
whether 17-year-olds are fully
responsible for their behavior. If
they are not, they should not be
punished as severely as individu-
als whose responsibility is not
diminished.
In order for something to
diminish criminal responsibility,
it has to be something that was
not the person’s fault—that was
outside his control. If someone
has an untreatable tumor on his frontal lobe that is thought to
make him unable to control aggressive outbursts, he is less
than fully responsible for his aggressive behavior, and the pres-
ence of the tumor would be viewed as a mitigating factor if he
were being sentenced for a violent crime. On the other hand, if
someone with no neurobiological deficit goes into a bar, drinks
himself into a state of rage, and commits a violent crime as a
result, the fact that he was drunk does not diminish his respon-
sibility for his act. It doesn’t matter whether the mitigating fac-
tor is biological, psychological, or environmental. The issue is
whether the diminished responsibility is the person’s fault and
whether the individual could have been able to compensate for
whatever it is that was uncontrollable.
Judgments about mitigation are often difficult to make
because most of the time, factors that diminish responsibility
fall somewhere between the extremes of things that are obvi-
ously beyond an individual’s control, such as brain tumors,
and those that an individual could have controlled, such as
self-inflicted inebriation. In many cases, things are not clear-
cut. One must make a judgment call, and one looks for evi-
dence that tips the balance in one direction or the other. Pro-
found mental retardation that compromises foresight is a miti-
gating condition. A lack of foresight as a result of stupidity that
is within the normal range of intelligence is not. Being forced
to commit a crime because a gun is pointed at one’s head mit-
igates criminal responsibility. Committing a crime in order to
save face in front of friends who have made a dare does not.
Many things can lead a person to act impulsively or without
foresight but are not necessarily mitigating. A genetic inclina-
tion toward aggression is probably in this category, as is having
been raised in a rotten neighborhood. Both are external forces,
but society does not see them as so determinative that they
automatically diminish personal responsibility.
As I have argued elsewhere,7 studies of adolescent brain
anatomy clearly indicate that regions of the brain that regulate
such things as foresight, impulse control, and resistance to
peer pressure are still developing at age 17. Imaging studies
show that immaturity in these regions is linked to adolescents’
poorer performance on tasks that require these capabilities.
There is evidence that the adolescent brain is less mature than
the adult brain in ways that affect some of the behaviors that
mitigate criminal responsibility. This suggests that at least
some of adolescents’ irresponsible behavior is not entirely
their fault.
The brain science, in and of itself, does not carry the day,
but when the results of behavioral science are added to the
mix, I think it tips the balance toward viewing adolescent
impulsivity, short-sightedness, and susceptibility to peer pres-
sure as developmentally normative phenomena that teenagers
cannot fully control. This is why I have argued that adolescents
should be viewed as inherently less responsible than adults and
should be punished less harshly than adults, even when their
crimes are identical.8 I do not find persuasive the counterargu-
ment that some adolescents can exercise self-control or that
some adults are just as impulsive and shortsighted as
teenagers. Of course there is variability in brain function and
behavior among adolescents, and of course there is variability
among adults. But the average differences between the age
groups are significant, and that is what counts as society draws
age boundaries under the law on the basis of science.
AGE RANGES FOR RESPONSIBILITY
Beyond criminal law, how should social policy involving
young people take this into account? Society needs to distin-
guish between people who are ready for the rights and respon-
sibilities of adulthood and those who are not. Science can help
in deciding where best to draw the lines. Based on what is now
known about brain development—and I say “now known”
because new studies are appearing every month—it is reason-
able to posit that there is an age range during which adult neu-
robiological maturity is reached. Framing this as an age range,
rather than pinpointing a discrete chronological age, is useful
because doing so accommodates the fact that different brain
systems mature along different timetables, and different indi-
viduals mature at different ages and  rates. The lower bound of
this age range is probably somewhere around 15, and the
upper bound is probably somewhere around 22. By this I mean
that if society had an agreed-upon measure of adult neurobio-
logical maturity (which it doesn’t yet have but may at some
point in the future), it would be unlikely that many normally
developing individuals would have attained this mark before
turning 15 and would have failed to reach it by age 22.
If society were to choose either of these endpoints as the age
of majority, it would be forced to accept many errors of classi-
fication because granting adult status at age 15 would result in
treating many immature individuals as adults, which is dan-
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gerous, whereas waiting until age 22 would result in treating
many mature individuals as children, which is unjust. So what
is society to do? I think there are four possible options.
The first option is to pick the mid-point of this range. Yes,
this would result in classifying some immature individuals as
adults and some mature ones as children. But this would be
true no matter what chronological age is picked, and assuming
that the age of neurobiological maturity is normally distrib-
uted, fewer errors would be made by picking an age near the
middle of the range than at either of the extremes. Doing so
would place the dividing line somewhere around 18, which, it
turns out, is the presumptive age of majority pretty much
everywhere around the world. In the vast majority of coun-
tries, 18 is the age at which individuals are permitted to vote,
drink, drive, and enjoy other adult rights. And just think—the
international community arrived at this without the benefit of
brain scans.
A second possibility would be to decide, on an issue-by-
issue basis, what it takes to be “mature enough.” Society does
this regularly. Although the presumptive age of majority in the
United States is 18, the nation deviates from this age more
often than not. Consider, for a moment, the different ages man-
dated for determining when individuals can make independent
medical decisions, drive, hold various types of employment,
marry, view R-rated movies without an adult chaperone, vote,
serve in the military, enter into contracts, buy cigarettes, and
purchase alcohol. The age of majority with respect to these
matters ranges from 15 to 21, which is surprisingly reasonable,
given what science says about brain development. The only
deviation I can think of that falls out of this range is the
nation’s inexplicable willingness to try people younger than 15
as adults, but this policy, in part because of the influence of
brain science, is now being questioned in many jurisdictions.
Although the aforementioned age range may be reasonable,
society doesn’t rely on science to link specific ages to specific
rights or responsibilities, and some of the nation’s laws are baf-
fling, to say the least, when viewed through the lens of science
or public health. How is it possible to rationalize permitting
teenagers to drive before they are permitted to see R-rated
movies on their own, sentencing juveniles to life without parole
before they are old enough to serve on a jury, or sending young
people into combat before they can buy beer? The answer is
that policies that distinguish between adolescents and adults
are made for all sorts of reasons, and science, including neuro-
science, is only one of many proper considerations.
A third possibility would be to shift from a binary classifi-
cation system, in which everyone is legally either a child or an
adult, to a regime that uses three legal categories: one for chil-
dren, one for adolescents, and one for adults. The nation does
this for some purposes under the law now, although the age
boundaries around the middle category aren’t necessarily sci-
entifically derived. For example, many states have graduated
drivers’ licensing, a system in which adolescents are permitted
to drive but are not granted full
driving privileges until they reach
a certain age. This model also is
used in the construction of child
labor laws, where adolescents are
allowed to work once they’ve
reached a certain age, but there
are limits on the types of jobs
they can hold and the numbers of
hours they can work.
In our book, Rethinking Juve-
nile Justice,9 Elizabeth Scott and I
have argued that this is how the
nation should structure the jus-
tice system, treating adolescent
offenders as an intermediate cate-
gory, neither as children, whose crimes society excuses, nor as
adults, whom society holds fully responsible for their acts.
While there are some areas of the law where a three-way sys-
tem would be difficult to imagine, such as voting, it has been
suggested that society should apply this model to other areas
of the law. For example, we could permit individuals between
18 and 20 to purchase beer and wine, but not hard liquor, and
implement especially stiff punishment for adolescents who
become intoxicated or engage in wrongdoing under the influ-
ence of alcohol. 
A final possibility is acknowledging that there is variability
in brain and behavioral development among people of the
same chronological age and making individualized decisions,
rather than drawing categorical age boundaries at all. Many of
the Supreme Court justices who dissented in the juvenile-
death-penalty and life-without-parole cases took this stance.
They argued that instead of treating adolescents as a class of
individuals who are too immature to be held fully responsible
for their behavior, the policy should be to assess each offender’s
maturity to determine his criminal culpability. The justices did
not specify what tools would be needed to do this, however,
and reliably assessing psychological maturity is easier said than
done. There is a big difference between using neuroscience to
guide the formulation of policy and using it to determine how
individual cases are adjudicated. Although it may be possible
to say that, on average, people who are Johnny’s age are typi-
cally less mature than adults, we cannot say whether Johnny
himself is.
Science may someday have the tools to image an adoles-
cent’s brain and draw conclusions about that individual’s neu-
robiological maturity relative to established age norms for var-
ious aspects of brain structure and function, but such norms
do not yet exist, and the cost of doing individualized assess-
ments of neurobiological maturity would be prohibitively
expensive. Moreover, it is not clear that society would end up
making better decisions using neurobiological assessments
than those it makes on the basis of chronological age or than
“There is a big
difference
between using
neuroscience to
guide the 
formulation of
policy and using
it to determine
how individual
cases are 
adjudicated.”
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those it might make using behavioral or psychological mea-
sures. It makes far more sense to rely on a driving test than a
brain scan to determine whether someone is ready to drive. So
don’t expect to see brain scanners any time soon at your local
taverns or movie theaters.
ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGES
The study of adolescent brain development has made
tremendous progress in the very short period that scientists
have been studying the adolescent brain systematically. As the
science moves ahead, the big challenge facing those of us who
want to apply this research to policy will be in understanding
the complicated interplay of biological maturation and envi-
ronmental influence as they jointly shape adolescent behavior.
And this can be achieved only through collaboration between
neuroscientists and scholars from other disciplines. Brain sci-
ence should inform the nation’s policy discussions when it is
relevant, but society should not make policy decisions on the
basis of brain science alone.
Whether the revelation that the adolescent brain may be
less mature than scientists had previously thought is ultimately
a good thing, a bad thing, or a mixed blessing for young peo-
ple remains to be seen. Some policymakers will use this evi-
dence to argue in favor of restricting adolescents’ rights, and
others will use it to advocate for policies that protect adoles-
cents from harm. In either case, scientists should welcome the
opportunity to inform policy discussions with the best avail-
able empirical evidence.
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